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TRACING IMPRINTS OF THE BORDER IN THE TERRITORIAL, JUSTICE AND 




Starting from the border as an ‘epistemic viewpoint’ (Mezzadra and Neilson 
2013), we seek to achieve conceptual depth about the nature of contemporary 
bordering practices by combining and re-evaluating empirical data collected 
within different bordering domains. We build on Mezzadra and Neilson’s 
concept of the ‘proliferation of borders’ by extending our focus to the impact 
of borders on individuals, arguing that border crossers experience an 
‘accumulation of borders’ as borders are ‘imprinted’ on their bodies through 
multiple and diverse encounters with various state agencies. By tracing the 
imprint of the border and its impact on the lives of border crossers in a range 
of contexts (the territorial, justice and welfare domain), we bring to light 
continuities in the governance of global mobility and the cumulative effects of 
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As mobility and migration stand high in political agendas and priorities and 
are conflated with concerns about crime and insecurity, border controls are 
increasingly embedded in structures and practices at and beyond the physical 
border (OMITTED, OMITTED, Brandariz-Garcia and Fernandez-Bessa 
2017). From schools, hospitals and welfare agencies to the justice system, the 
workplace and the housing sector, both private and public actors are required 
to systematically check entitlements to public support and services, to access 
work or accommodation, or rehabilitation programs. In short, border controls 
have been outsourced to a range of institutions and actors, and their reach has 
been significantly expanded. While not every element of this emerging control 
system is directly linked to criminal justice as traditionally understood, 
Bowling and Westenra (2018a, 2018b) note that the ‘crimmigration control 
system’ – where ‘crimmigration’ (Stumpf 2006) refers to the convergence of 
criminal and immigration law and practice - works in tandem with criminal 
justice systems to delineate and define ‘suspect communities’. It is therefore a 
subject of increasing concern to criminological researchers. 
As political philosopher Étienne Balibar (2004, 1) explains, borders are 
forms of defining and identifying people; as such they are ‘dispersed a little 
everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is 
happening and is controlled’. Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) refer to this 




emphasize their productive function. Borders play a crucial role in the 
‘fabrication of the world’: ‘far from serving simply to block or obstruct global 
flows, [they] have become essential devices for their articulation’ (Mezzadra 
and Neilson 2013, 3). Borders in their multiplicity therefore create systems of 
differential inclusion (Mezzadra and Neilson 2011) produced by processes of 
illegalization and differential entitlement. 
In this article we conceptualize bordering practices as expressions of 
sovereignty and mediators of relations between individuals and the state. We 
emphasize the productive nature of these practices, from a state perspective, to 
differentiate, stratify and govern populations, and consider the implications for 
border crossers. We argue that border control processes and practices not only 
‘make people illegal’ (Dauvergne 2008); they create differential inclusion and 
have a cumulative effect. Drawing on Mezzadra and Neilson’s Border as 
Method (2013), we adopt and expand the conceptualization of borders as 
‘epistemological viewpoints’. ‘Border as method’ is a technique of knowledge 
production that involves translation of research data across diverse bordering 
contexts in order to identify deeper theoretical connections, in contrast with 
ethnographic approaches that are typically embedded in a particular locale. 
Border as method therefore directs border control researchers to focus on ‘new 
relations of connectivity across discrete spaces and organizations of data’ 
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 59) in order to achieve ‘depth through breadth’. 
By considering the border in this way, we hope to better understand and 




(exterior/interior; us/them; center/periphery) contribute to reproduce 
marginality, subordination, exploitation and dispossession. Moreover, this 
conceptualization reveals the underlying connections of borders to other forms 
of surveillance, regulation and governance, and facilitates the broadening of 
the criminological focus to the continuities in these forms of governance and 
exercise of power. 
We seek to make two key contributions to the existing border 
criminology literature (Aas and Bosworth 2013; Bosworth et al 2018). At the 
conceptual level, we explore the notion of ‘imprinting’ as a form of 
governance of global mobility. Focusing on the dispersed, hybrid and 
transnational nature of migration control and the traces they leave on the 
individuals subject to them, we chart the continuities and the cumulative effect 
of these bordering practices as a novel form of governance of human 
movement. At the methodological level, drawing on the notion of ‘borders as 
method’, we seek to develop tools within criminology to study the mechanics 
of contemporary forms of governance which while institutionally embedded 
within the nation-state transcends them. By amalgamating data from three 
different projects conducted in different jurisdictions, we highlight the 
advantages of multi-sited ethnographies to study bordering practices. 
The first of our original contributions in this article is to argue that borders are 
not only dispersed in time and space, but have a cumulative effect on 
individuals who cross them, which we describe as ‘imprinting’. Borders are 




by the processes they employ to enact the border. As we demonstrate, these 
encounters leave traces, a barcode of sorts that can be read in countries of 
transit and destination by border officials, law enforcement, criminal justice 
system officials, and other state agencies. They can also have serious 
consequences for border crossers, such as immobilization in countries of 
transit, as well as removal and deportation from countries of destination.  
Previous border control research has considered how individuals may 
‘embody’ the border through socio-cultural markers such as ethnicity and race 
(see Aguirre and Simmers 2008-9, Bowling and Westenra 2018). While these 
categorizations may be crucial in shaping an individual’s encounter with 
border officials, they exist prior to these encounters as primary social 
categories that can be ‘read’ directly from the body. Here we reverse this 
process to consider how the border imprints itself on individuals through the 
conferral of a legal status that is less visible, but will have lasting effects on 
the relationship between the individual and the state. Viewed from the 
perspective of border crossers, the imprint of their encounter with borders 
continues to produce experiences of differential inclusion as they go about 
their daily lives 
In terms of methodological innovation, border as method favors the 
integration and reinterpretation of existing knowledge from previously 
unconnected sources as much as the collection of new empirical data. We 
combine findings from three different projects conducted in three different 




operates and through which mechanisms. Rather than concentrating on 
different domains within a single nation-state, we amalgamate data obtained 
from multiple jurisdictions as this approach allows us to trace the 
accumulation of borders and imprints we could not identify on a local level. 
Drawing from the multi-sited ethnography literature, we highlight the impact 
of nation-state contexts on specific forms of governance and the continuities in 
state practices of control in very different settings (Marcus 1995; Falzon 2009; 
Coleman and von Hellerman 2009). These unconnected multi-sited 
ethnographies allow us to bring to light associations between different sites 
and processes, and the impact of connections on situated subjects which 
cannot be accounted for by concentrating on a single site of intensive 
investigation. Although the projects we conducted separately were not 
designed a priori as multi-sited, their amalgamation at a later stage proved 
helpful for capturing global continuities in forms of mobility governance 
which despite being anchored within the nation-state transcend it. Such post 
facto multi-sited ethnography allowed us to follow the border wherever it 
manifests within and across domains and sites. Further details about 
methodology are included later in the sections reporting findings from the 
individual studies.  
We explore the productive dimension of bordering practices in three 
different scenarios (the territorial domain, the justice domain and the welfare 
domain) and in three different localities (in the Western Balkans, in the UK, 




accumulative effects on border crossers. In drawing together apparently 
unconnected studies, we seek to achieve ‘depth through breadth’ while 
foregrounding continuities in the investigation of the contemporary exercise of 
state power. In each context we argue that bordering discourses and practices 
create distance, hierarchies and precarities, and in turn legitimize and 
underscore the rationale for enforcement practices – most notably territorial 
exclusion. By bringing the findings of the projects together, we aim to capture 
the complexity, extent and multi-faceted nature of bordering which each single 
project would not be capable of revealing. We begin our analysis with 
empirical observations from a territorial border at the edge of Europe.    
 
The territorial domain: where global North  
meets global South 
 
Contemporary border zones dividing the global South from the global North 
are spaces where the boundaries of differential inclusion are simultaneously 
enforced and contested (Borja and Castells 1997). As global mobility 
intensifies, these frontiers are key sites for enforcing geo-political and socio-
economic boundaries through inclusion, temporary exclusion, or rejection and 
return of border crossers. Bordering practices target illegalized non-citizens at 
different and multiple points of intervention, in countries of origin, transit and 
destination. As we demonstrate below, in their encounters with border 




it suits the nation-state) with a multitude of permanent and more or less visible 
stamps. Every step of the way, as they encounter police, express intention to 
seek asylum, pause to rest and get funds to keep going, or when apprehended 
and deported to where they came from only to move forward again, these 
imprints adhere to border crossers. Like the mini barcode tags glued to 
travelers’ suitcases, they are almost impossible to remove, and can be easily 
read at various checkpoints, such as immigration-criminal justice and welfare 
systems in the countries of destination. Increasingly deployed in the global 
South as well as the global North, these interventions are contested through 
border struggles - interactions of border crossers and agents of border control 
(border police, customs, and other government agencies). In this section we 
focus on accumulation of borders in the key transit countries on the Western 
Balkans migration route –Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia and 
Serbia.1 We investigate various strategies through which borders enable and 
interrupt human mobilities in this part of the world, with an aim to stratify and 
govern mobile populations. Imprints applied in countries of transit, we argue, 
assist in creating manageable flows of people that will ultimately take place in 
labour markets and asylum systems of the West. Importantly, they can also 
assist nation-states in removing unwanted non-citizens after they complete 
their migratory journeys. 
In southeast Europe, the border police enforce the boundaries of the 
nations through which illegalized non-citizens transit towards Western Europe, 




practices of border externalization and stratification. Here, bordering practices 
and struggles between agents of border enforcement and people subject to 
border enforcement practices are hidden from our view, and more often than 
not remain out of focus of academic inquiry (OMITTED). However, imprints 
of their encounters with territorial borders are omnipresent, and a poignant 
reminder of the productive nature of contemporary borders. 
In the Western Balkans, especially since the start of the ‘migrant crisis’ 
in 2012-2013, the articulation of global passages through bordering practices 
has never been more apparent. The border fence on the Serbian-Hungarian 
border is just one, although perhaps the most conspicuous example of ever-
growing border assemblage in the region that followed the passage of 
thousands of illegalized non-citizens from Middle East and Africa through the 
Western Balkans, mainly FYR Macedonia and Serbia. According to 
FRONTEX (2017), the number of irregular border crossings on the Western 
Balkans route rose from 6,390 in 2012, to 764,038 in 2014. This influx 
generated multiple changes in border regimes that ultimately led to people’s 
(more or less provisional) immobility at European Union’s external borders, as 
demonstrated by our research in the region. Effective migration management 
has been identified as a crucial task for the EU candidate states of the Western 
Balkans, in particular Serbia and FYR Macedonia as they are located at the 
very heart of the Western Balkans migratory route. As we demonstrate below, 
driven by external and internal forces, the border regime in these two countries 




to semi-permeable in late 2015, and a border shutdown in March 2016. As this 
change occurred, border crossers experienced accumulation of borders through 
multiple imprints attached to them by border police and other state agencies. 
Importantly, the people on the move increasingly faced immobilization, 
pushbacks, and forced removals by state agencies. 
From the onset of the migrant crisis until its peak in 2015, the approach 
to irregular migration management in the region was largely a policy of 
limited engagement (OMITTED; Beznec et al. 2016). Law enforcement and 
specialized border police forces mostly ignored the influx of people from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Syria and Africa, while strategies to prevent border crossings 
and/or returns were limited. While military-style pushbacks were deployed to 
prevent migrants to enter their territory as ‘border police [were]… simply 
pushing migrants back and forth [across the border], like a game of table 
tennis’ (participant 4, NGO, Serbia), once they were in FYR Macedonia and 
Serbia people on the move encountered suspended asylum procedure. As one 
NGO activist from Serbia explained: ‘Police are simply not processing them. I 
am not sure why. [People] are simply coming and going’ (participant 1, NGO). 
This approach enabled border crossers to quickly reach Hungary or Croatia, as 
the migration and asylum regime were largely suspended in the region. Indeed, 
agencies actively refused to imprint the label of asylum seeker on transiting 
non-citizens, as such outcomes were not deemed productive (or indeed 
necessary) for transiting states of the Western Balkans. Deadlines to complete 




women and children routinely left transit states before their claim was 
considered (participant 1, NGO, Serbia; participant 5, GA, Serbia; participant 
30, GA, Kosovo; participant 38, INGO). As one participant from an 
international NGO working in the region pointed out, ‘people wait, and wait 
for a decision that never comes, and they simply leave’ (participant 9, INGO). 
An average stay of non-citizens in Serbia in early 2015 was approximately 
three weeks (Lukić 2016), while the pace of transit through FYR Macedonia 
was such that, by October 2015 the state agencies recorded only 50 asylum 
applications (Lilyanova 2016, 6) and granted only one asylum that year 
(Beznec et al. 2016, 14). The pretence was apparent: illegalised non-citizens 
claimed asylum only when “caught” by police, yet with a clear intention to 
leave transit states as soon as possible; on the other hand, police processed 
them but with a minimum effort, simply waiting for unwanted “visitors” to 
move on: 
A police officer told me that it is in their best interest – police’s best 
interest – not to do anything, and let people pass [through]. They want 
that. (participant 24, NGO, Serbia) 
 
I do not understand what is happening lately. …  The only logical 
explanation is that [non-citizens] are not here long enough to … apply 
for asylum [in Serbia]. Police obviously refuse to act on it. (participant 
18, GA, Serbia) 
 
This reluctance to apply imprints on border crossers was also underpinned by 
racism and nationalism of the local population, as the native population did not 
approve of people perceived to be racially different and dangerous in the 




a perceived and imminent threat caused by ‘crimmigrant others’ (Aas 2011), 
as this interviewee recalled: ‘[T]here was a protest against the asylum centre 
[and] a local woman… said: “Now, close your eyes and imagine that someone 
rapes your mother, daughter, sister”’ (participant 2, NGO).   
A significant policy shift occurred in late 2015, following strong anti-
migrant rhetoric from some EU member states (see Rayner and Mullholand 
2015). In June 2015, Hungary commenced building a fence along the Serbian-
Hungarian border, while the EU Commission announced that all non-citizens 
that fail to obtain asylum in the EU will be returned to transit countries 
(Radišić et al. 2015, 68). These security-driven practices underpinned policy 
change to non-entreé, in which the majority of illegalized non-citizens were to 
be kept on the other side of the external border through (often violent) 
pushbacks at the territorial border (see Šalamon 2016). By not allowing the 
entry state agencies yet again refused to apply imprints on border crossers, 
except the one of an exclusion and removal. Crimmigration rhetoric that 
framed non-citizens as a threat to state security underpinned this development, 
as the following headline in Serbia’s tabloid newspaper illustrates: 
Terrorists hide amongst migrants: Hundreds have already passed 
through Serbia, there is a fear that some are still in our country! 
(Telegraf 22 August 2015; for more examples see OMITTED 2017; 
Beznec et al. 2016) 
 
Following these developments, during late 2015 and early 2016 borders on the 
Western Balkans migration route remained semi-permeable. Men, women and 




Iraq – assessed to be ‘genuine refugees’- were allowed to enter FYR 
Macedonia and Serbia, lodge their asylum claim, or transit towards the EU 
(Beznec et al. 2016). As the migration pressure continued, in March 2016 the 
borders of the Western Balkans transit states were officially shut down, 
leaving thousands of people stranded in FYR Macedonia and Serbia. Yet, the 
pushbacks and non-entreé policy were met with resistance among the stranded 
population. After the official closure, around 24,000 people passed through 
Serbia between March and August (Kingsley 2016), while FRONTEX 
estimated that nearly 123,000 illegal border crossings occurred on the Western 
Balkans route in 2016 (FRONTEX 2017).  
Mezzadra and Neilson (2013, 143) argue that ‘[t]he temporality of 
migration is increasingly marked by the emergence of various zones and 
experiences of waiting, holding, and interruption that assume many 
institutional forms, among them camps and deportation facilities’. As the 
context of the Western Balkans highlights, such zones of waiting, holding, and 
interruption often have no walls, barbwire fences and wardens. These buffer 
zones at the fringes of the EU largely rest on the politics and policies of EU 
nation-states (Beznec et al. 2016, 22, 56), enforced in countries of transit. 
During the “crisis” the Western Balkans became a semi-periphery, a buffer 
zone in which mobile populations were housed and immobilized, stratified and 
gradually filtered through, through accumulation of borders and selective 
application of border imprints. In doing so, FYR Macedonia and Serbia have 




These policies, we argue, were never exclusively designed to seal the borders 
and prevent the entry of illegalized non-citizens. They were porous by design, 
as their productive function was to regulate the pace of migration through 
stratification and differential inclusion of border crossers. Importantly, these 
interventions were also set to assist in identifying those border crossers that 
should be removed from the countries of destination. The multiple effects of 
imprints, as we will demonstrate later in the paper, can and often do result in a 
removal of non-citizens, via immigration-criminal justice and welfare 
interventions.  
Bordering practices in the Western Balkans served to articulate and 
stratify mobility flows. As Bojadžijev and Karakayali (cited in Heidenreich 
and Vukadinović 2008, 141) note, ‘Europe is not sealing itself off, rather a 
complex system is emerging, one of limitation, differentiation, hierarchies and 
partial inclusion of migrant groups’. The migrant “crisis” brought an excess of 
border crossers who were selectively filtered through. 
The already precarious status of illegalized non-citizens is heightened 
through encounters at the territorial border in countries of transit, making 
apparent the accumulation of border imprints. Every time people on the move 
engage with border agencies or enforcers, either at border crossings or in the 
asylum centres, an imprint of such an encounter – or lack of - marks various 
practices of stratification, violence, expulsion, marginality, and governance. 




the most physically intimidating of these new walls serves to regulate rather 
than exclude legal and illegal migrant labor’.  
 
In the next section, we trace the imprint of the border beyond the territorial 
domain by exploring how immigration controls amalgamate in novel ways 
with other forms of governance to police the borders of the nation. 
 
Criminal justice imprints: demarcating the borders  
of citizenship and belonging 
 
Amid the highly politicized and securitized field of migration controls, 
bordering practices aiming at identifying and rendering mobile populations 
governable are embedded in institutional structures and bureaucratic practices, 
including the criminal justice system. In a highly mobile and fluid 
contemporary world, national criminal justice institutions are key spaces 
where sovereignty is exercised. In turn, these are shaped by processes of 
globalization and mass mobility. As Sassen argued, globalization is an ‘in 
here’ phenomenon, it is constituted inside the national and local space (Sassen 
2008, 74). Criminal justice institutions might be conceived as sites of 
bordering where global population flows are blocked, filtered, channelled 
through, and driven out.  
Imagining the local criminal courts as global courts (OMITTED) brings 




production of subjectivities. Citizenship has become an important category for 
sorting populations caught up by the criminal justice system (Aas and 
Bosworth 2013). In the UK, the presence of the ‘foreign national’ inside the 
criminal courts sets in motion a range of measures to identify, immobilize and 
route them through the immigration-criminal justice system, and makes 
apparent the place of these institutions in the architecture of controls to govern 
the mobility of the global poor. For some, the imprints of the border manifest 
and are reinforced through criminal justice practices, and can be consequential 
for both criminal justice and immigration law outcomes.  
By drawing on interviews with court staff, observations of court 
proceedings and analysis of files involving individuals identified as foreign 
nationals,2 in this section we look at the ways in which the border operates 
inside the courtroom. The imprints of the border pop up continuously in 
defendants’ files and hearings, alerting criminal justice actors about their 
‘foreignness’ and shaping the outcome of the criminal case. Even before cases 
reach the court, border control practices filter the cases that reach the court. As 
inland border policing becomes enmeshed in public policing (OMITTED; 
Armenta 2017), the police routinely work in cooperation with Immigration 
Enforcement to route non-British suspects through criminal justice or 
immigration enforcement pathways. Both immigration policies and policing 
practices can shape the court docket by making certain national groups visible 
and thus subject to criminalization. Asked about fluctuations on the foreign 




about the impact of EU enlargement in the early 2000s on the increase 
numbers of Eastern Europeans passing through the court: ‘Well that was a 
pattern that occurred over the last sort of year’, he reckoned, as  
Very rarely did we send, we see Eastern Europeans, or very rarely I see 
Eastern Europeans until the changes in the rules for coming into the 
country. Then there seemed to be a sudden increase (Interview 
Magistrate 1).  
 
The operation of the border as a regulatory mechanism for enabling certain 
national groups (and blocking others) shapes the national and determines who 
appears before the court.  
The cumulative effect of bordering practices adds another layer of 
differentiation to the highly stratified space of the court. The crossing of the 
geographical border changes people’s markers of identity. Reflecting the 
hierarchies within citizenship regimes and the racialization of citizenship 
(Romero 2008), for some people foreignness constitutes a stigma. A stigma is, 
according to Goffman (1963), an attribute which becomes discreditable in 
particular social contexts and thus is highly contingent. It is a relationship 
between a personal attribute and a social stereotype. Being a foreigner for 
some people is a master status and a discredited social identity. In some of the 
cases observed in this research, those involved were conscious of their tainted 
social identity. In one of them, involving two young men originally from 
Poland accused of breaking into a car, one of the defendants mentioned in his 
pre-sentence report that he was ‘intimated that his actions may evoke fear in 




who was also accused of criminal damage, justified his behavior as a reaction 
to the racist abuse he suffered from the owners of the property. Although 
according to the law3 the civic status of these defendants as non-citizens had 
formally little bearing in the criminal case against them, they were well aware 
about the currency of images and ideas socially ascribed to their identity as 
Polish. The law operates in complex ways to produce the differential inclusion 
of certain groups. The lifting of migration controls has apparently contributed 
to the racialization of Polish and other Eastern European citizens, and to create 
complex forms of civic and social stratification (Fox et al, 2012), which are 
apparent inside the courtroom.   
As another manifestation of the imprint of borders, ‘foreignness’ surface 
in court proceedings and are legally relevant in certain circumstances. 
Mobility represents a challenge for law enforcement (Aas and Gundhus 2016). 
In an era of globalization, the fluidity of people and goods conflicts with 
demands in the law for stability and fixity to a place. People involved in cross-
border occupations (such as lorry drivers), who have transient lives in the 
country with family and friends elsewhere and whose history and identity are 
not recorded in official records (criminal, welfare, educational, financial, etc.), 
raise distinctive challenges to criminal justice adjudication. The absence of 
information impairs sentencing and often casts doubts on the individual’s past, 
as this probation officer implies in a pre-sentence report on a young man from 
Vietnam who pleaded guilty to cultivation of cannabis: ‘as far as one can 




frustrating to the report writer that we do not have access to any potential 
antecedents overseas’. A prosecutor who works at the magistrates’ court 
agreed: ‘I think if somebody has recently come to the country and they appear 
to be of good character… I would probably just mention “no previous 
convictions in this country”, you don’t know really’ (Interview Prosecutor 1).  
Under these circumstances, pre-trial detention and imprisonment acquire 
the specific function of making transient and illegalized populations 
identifiable and governable (OMITTED). In denying her bail, the magistrates 
told a woman charged with hitting another and caught at Luton airport 
boarding a flight bound to Romania: ‘you do not have family ties or any other 
good reason for staying in one place’. By immobilizing these groups through 
confinement, the criminal justice process makes them legible and serves their 
‘documentation’ (Bosworth 2012, 133). A probation officer working at the 
magistrates’ court admitted this collateral function of the criminal justice 
involvement:  
We have, for example, a large influx of Romanian offenders, who 
generally are being tied up at the moment. And over a relatively short 
[period], quite a number of them are repeat guests within the system, 
developing quite large criminal profiles. We are therefore getting better 
profiles on some nationalities and groups compared to others. We are 
getting better in a perverse way (Interview Probation Officer 1).  
 
Criminal courts are not immune to immigration policies and imperatives. 
Probation officers and court clerks are routinely required to liaise with 
immigration enforcement bureaucrats to ascertain the immigration status of 




person is criminally charged, illegality and deportability can take center stage 
in the construction of a criminal case (Lynch 2015). A criminal conviction 
triggers deportation,5 and deportability may influence sentencing and post-
sentencing. Appealing to pragmatism, defense counsel would argue that 
deportability makes imprisonment futile because the parallel immigration 
system will deal with the person. On the other hand, the prosecution would 
cast doubts on the automatism of deportation, as this prosecutor explained:  
[The defendant’s deportation is] dealt with so separately, and there’s 
never really any guarantee that someone is going to be deported. If the 
police say to us, ‘he’s probably going to be deported,’ I think we just 
proceed on the basis that they’re not because we never really have that 
concrete information that they’re going to be (Interview Prosecutor 1).  
 
On the other hand, deportability shapes post-sentence supervision6 because 
deportable prisoners are not deemed to be integrated back into society and 
must be kept under watch in preparation for their departure (Kaufman 2015).  
Illegalization and precarious status contribute to a range of social, 
welfare and economic problems which in turn lead to criminalization and pose 
challenges to the everyday work of the courts. While the regular court’s 
clientele endures the evil of social marginality, precarious status, language 
barriers and lack of social and family networks compound matters for foreign 
nationals.7 A growing population of civically and socially marginalized people 
reaches the criminal courts posing distinctive legal and logistical challenges to 
court operators. The criminal justice system is premised on a minimum level 




residence, and with no access to public welfare, people with precarious status 
are ‘dead ends’ in this system. Sentencing options are restricted, as a local 
barrister explained:  
The judges and the criminal justice system have serious restrictions to 
deal with this population [of people with irregular migration status, 
without family, address, regular work]. There are options not opened to 
them. The only option is to free them or to send them to prison, no 
option of granting a community order or a suspended sentence 
(Interview Defence Lawyer 1).  
 
Because some foreign nationals are not eligible to welfare support, post-
sentence supervision can be ineffective for achieving social reintegration and 
curving reoffending. The privatization of the probation service in England and 
Wales whereby post-sentence supervision of offenders in the community has 
been outsourced to private companies (Robinson 2016) might exacerbate this 
problem. As a probation officer who works at the crown court admits,  
If they are not deported at the end of sentence, they are transferred to the 
CRC [Communities Rehabilitation Companies] for supervision in 
community… Generally, they are not granted public funds (housing, 
training, unemployment benefits) so there are no incentives for private 
companies to work with this population because they are likely to miss 
performance targets (Interview Probation Officer 2).  
 
According to this practitioner, because private companies are measured by 
performance targets (including the reduction in reoffending among the 
individuals they supervise), the low prospect of rehabilitation among this 
group makes them unattractive to CRCs.      
Borders leave imprints on individuals which are consequential for 




manifests well beyond the court appearance. Criminal justice practices, we 
posit, bolster social and geographical borders by enabling geographical 
exclusion, thwarting civic incorporation and potentially reinforcing socio-
economic inequalities. In the next section, we turn our attention to the 
administration of welfare support of asylum seekers in Australia tracing the 
imprints of the border in the operation of this bureaucratic process.   
 
Bordering through welfare surveillance: the enduring imprint  
of illegalization 
 
Restricting the distribution of resources within the nation state to legal 
members through ‘welfare nationalism’ (Barker 2015) is productive for 
governments in defining the boundaries of citizenship. The manipulation of 
welfare entitlements through systems of ‘creative civil exclusion’ (Bowling 
and Westenra 2018b) can act as an internal bordering mechanism, serving both 
to reinforce the boundaries of social membership (a symbolic function) and to 
manufacture ‘voluntary’ departures (OMITTED).  
For asylum seekers, arrival in Australia by sea without a visa, creates an 
imprint of imputed illegality that conditions their ongoing relations with the 
state. This is exemplified in the operation of the Status Resolution Support 
Service (SRSS)8 that supports asylum seekers living within the Australian 
community. So-called ‘illegal maritime arrivals’  – known in official circles by 




crossing and have been subjected to extraordinarily punitive policies. The term 
‘IMAs’ will be used in this discussion as a reminder of the powerful and 
accumulating imprint the territorial border has made on these individuals on 
their journey through the asylum determination system. In common with the 
previous sections, we will see that the welfare-based bordering practices 
discussed here make this category of non-citizens identifiable and governable, 
deliberately create precarity, and produce criminalization and illegality.9  
The SRSS scheme was introduced in 2015 following a gradual shift 
away from mandatory detention for all IMAs. Asylum seekers who are not 
detained live in the community on short term, renewable bridging visas 
(BVEs). IMAs have severely restricted entitlements but, along with other BVE 
holders experiencing hardship, they may be eligible for SRSS support if they 
have not been granted work rights or have been unable to obtain employment. 
Both work rights and financial support are withdrawn after a ‘double negative’ 
result involving rejection of an asylum application at both the first instance 
and review stage.  
The provision of SRSS support is contracted out by the Department of 
Immigration and Border Control (DIBP) to non-government welfare agencies 
on the proviso that services be provided ‘at no greater level’ than for the wider 
population (Interview Government1). Most IMAs will be on the lowest band 
of support (Band 6), receiving 89 per cent of the minimum social security 
benefit available to Australian citizens, placing them well below the poverty 




other recognized vulnerabilities receive additional casework support on Band 
5. Associated with the different support bands are different levels of control. 
The highest level of support (Band 1) includes unaccompanied minors in 
‘community detention’ who reside in designated accommodation under close 
supervision. SRSS recipients on Bands 4 to 6, while receiving less direct 
supervision, must nevertheless sign a ‘code of behaviour’ contract, discussed 
further below. 
The scheme is marked by extreme complexity, uncertainty and 
discretion. NGOs report frequent delays in renewing the bridging visas that 
provide eligibility for support. In addition, community workers argue that 
hardships have been deliberately designed-in to the system:  
 
I mean, it feels to me that the system works basically to manage risk for 
the department, to ensure that the people who are under that system do 
not kill themselves. And beyond that, the actual support, or I guess, 
welfare provisions, are very minimal. (Interview NGO9). 
 
The stated reason for the introduction of the SRSS is to encourage asylum 
seekers to stay in touch with immigration authorities while their applications 
are finalized. As one SRSS provider explained: ‘The end game … isn’t the 
client. The end game is the status being resolved’ (Interview Government2).  
The welfare support system is therefore organized around a bordering logic, 
and represents an accumulation of borders in which the endgame of possible 
removal is perpetually in play. Providing early information to those on a 
‘negative pathway’ to let them know their situation is ‘not looking good’ was 




judged to have evaded control at the border, the imprint of their illegalized 
border crossing shapes bureaucratic systems designed to effect their eventual 
expulsion under the guise of welfare support. One interviewee described 
departmental communications with asylum seekers as ‘paper intimidation’ 
designed to convey the message ‘trip up and you’re out’ (Interview Health7). 
Neither immigration officials nor NGO informants expressed the view 
that encouraging premature returns was an explicit objective of the 
SRSS. However, several interviewees, including this community 
worker, were prepared to speculate: ‘I've got no evidence for it being a 
strategy. Clients definitely think it is’ (Interview NGO7). 
 
Another interviewee stressed instead the powerful symbolic function of 
restricting access to services: ‘I think it’s very much about notions of 
citizenship and who’s Australian and who’s not’ (Interview NGO8). While 
DIBP informants all claimed that the scheme’s purpose was to support 
applicants through the asylum process, one acknowledged that the potential for 
withdrawal of support provided a mechanism of control:  
 
Where it gets a little bit more hard-edged is where someone has had the 
negative decisions, and they are in that position where they have to 
contemplate a voluntary return, and what level of support we may or 
may not provide to them at that point. (Interview Government1)  
 
The combination of repeatedly providing information about departure while 
withdrawing material support creates systemic conditions of extreme precarity, 
as recognized by this SRSS service provider:  
The department won’t necessarily instruct or enforce someone to leave, 
but they will say –“You need to begin making arrangements”. But the 
position of limbo that that person is then in … is precarious to say the 





The accumulating effect of denial of services to this highly surveilled group 
was seen as a ‘pretty clear indicator’ that ‘we want you to leave and if you stay 
it’s going to be hard as hell’ (Interview NGO10). As an act of resistance some 
asylum seekers reportedly refused SRSS support that was only offered on the 
condition that they take steps to leave (Interview NGO7).  
While some participants speculated that the system might operate in a 
way that encourages departures, they were less inclined to accept that such 
deprivations actually produced decisions to leave. One health worker who said 
that it was ‘obvious’ and ‘fairly explicit’ that measures such as denying work 
rights, family reunion or access to services were ‘all about returns’, was 
nevertheless unaware of any clients who had decided to leave on those 
grounds (Interview Health8). A community worker agreed that ‘in my 
experience, it’s not often that people leave’ (Interview NGO9). And this 
immigration lawyer noted: ‘You’re throwing more horrific circumstances at 
them. And my experience is not that they return home. It’s just - they go mad’ 
(Interview NGO4). Where ‘voluntary’ departure did occur, the reasons cited 
most often by research participants were a desire for family reunification, lack 
of work rights or opportunities, and medical crises.  
Even if the outcomes from the SRSS scheme are unclear, the system is 
productive for government in creating a network of surveillance and control 
that renders ‘IMAs’, who are indelibly imprinted with the trace of their first 
encounter with the Australian border, identifiable and governable within the 




surveillance and – I mean; this is not even welfare.  This is just going through 
certain bureaucratic processes to access services’ (Interview NGO9). SRSS 
caseworkers contracted to provide personal support for asylum seekers are 
coopted into this surveillance system. Requirements to report to DIBP can be 
triggered by major health events, unaccompanied minors missing school, or 
SRSS recipients being a victim, perpetrator or witness to a crime.  
On top of these stringent visa conditions, an enforceable code of 
behavior was introduced in 2013. The preamble to the Explanatory 
Statement10 reads: ‘The Government has become increasingly concerned about 
non-citizens who engage in conduct that is not in line with the expectations of 
the Australian community’. This suggests that the introduction of the code was 
aimed at publicly reinforcing the symbolic boundary between those who are 
perceived to adhere to ‘Australian values’, and those who are not.  
In a move that illustrates the accumulating effects of borders, asylum 
seekers are now required to sign the code of behavior to be eligible for a 
bridging visa. This injects a quasi-criminal dimension welfare provision for 
this group. During the implementation period, SRSS caseworkers were 
required to encourage their existing clients to sign the contract, further 
compromising their role as service providers. No statistics are published about 
the operation of the code. One government informant said he was aware of 
‘only one or two cases’ where bridging visas were cancelled (enabling 
removal) for non-criminal breaches of the code (Interview Government1). 




threat of re-detention that hung over the heads of their clients, greatly 
increasing their precarious status in relation to the state. Even without the 
code, one advocate noted: ‘People say sometimes they’ve been re-detained on 
the smallest, stupidest little things. You’d have to detain half the country if 
that was – if these things were criminal offenses’ (Interview NGO10). This 
threat was believed to be a more powerful incentive for ‘voluntary’ departure 
than welfare restrictions, although many asylum seekers still resisted until the 
point of re-detention.  
The SRSS scheme operates as an internal bordering practice, mediated 
through federal welfare provision and backed up by the sanction of detention. 
The existence of a separate welfare scheme for asylum seekers who bear the 
imprint of their irregular crossing of the Australian border provides a powerful 
mechanism of control and surveillance that is productive for government and 
reflects the accumulation of borders. It renders governable a group of 
illegalized non-citizens who would previously have been detained throughout 
the entire asylum determination process. It enacts a powerful form of 
‘inclusive exclusion’ (Aas 2011, citing Agamben) that prepares the ground for 
physical exclusion when that becomes legally possible. As a system of welfare 
surveillance, it has the practical effect of generating compliance in 
circumstances of sustained legal and material precarity, and also projects 
sovereign power symbolically by demarcating the boundary between those 







In this article, we combined the theoretical insights offered in Border as 
Method with a series of grounded empirical analyses at multiple sites, to 
advance socio-legal and criminological enquiries about the governance of 
global mobility both substantively and methodologically. In so doing, we 
sought to achieve ‘depth through breadth’ and identified continuities across 
case studies by tracing the imprint and cumulative effects of borders on the 
material lives of border crossers. Our analysis has demonstrated the productive 
function of borders as methods of governance, expressions of sovereignty and 
mediators of relations between non-citizens and states. Our three different case 
studies show how bordering practices leave imprints on individuals that 
accumulate across different border domains. Their cumulative effect has been 
generated by a range of interventions and actions of state agents over a 
significant period of time, and has not been linked to one person or site. 
Rather, we argue that accumulation of borders leave imprints that have 
significant impact on groups of people in domains we analysed: border 
crossers, non-citizens, and asylum seekers. In three separate case studies 
outlined above, we demonstrate how imprints render novel forms of 
governance of human movement in countries of transit and destination, to 
produce practices of stratification, removal, marginality, detention and 




As mass human mobility becomes a distinctive aspect of our 
globalized world, the ever more stringent controls over the mobility of the 
persecuted and the global poor bring to the fore planetary interconnectivities 
and highlight geo-political dimensions in the operation of ‘national’ 
institutions. These controls not only make national boundaries visible – and 
painful for some - but also shape subjectivities and life chances as the legal, 
social, economic and political imprints of the border follow border crossers to 
produce hierarchies of citizenship. Vice-versa, as we showed, geo-political 
borders map onto and depend on social categories that divide up and stratify 
human beings, like race, class, gender, and nationality. In advocating for 
‘globally-aware’ and ‘integrative’ methodologies, we make the case for the 
importance of expanding disciplinary and geo-political boundaries in the study 
of migration control.  
By treating the border as an epistemological device, we aimed to 
enhance understanding of the mechanics of contemporary forms of governance 
that produce hierarchies of differential inclusion in a range of contexts. 
Although we are cautious about drawing strict comparisons across 
heterogenous sites and practices, the paper sought to bring to light continuities 
in the governance of global mobility. The advantage of multi-sited 
ethnography, as demonstrated in this article, is in tracing continuing and 
cumulative effects of borders that could not be captured by researching 
isolated, local sites within the nation-state. We also believe the methodologies 




governance that are exercised, not only through border controls, but also 
across other surveillance and regulatory regimes. In doing so, we strived to 
develop methodological tools within criminology to study control practices 
which, although anchored in the local and the national, transcends them. By 
bringing together findings from different border control projects, we hope to 
open new creative ways to study the mechanics of bordering practices. We 
therefore advocate broadening the focus of criminology to incorporate the 
study of coercive and in/exclusionary power wherever it occurs. 
 
References 
Aas, K. F. (2011) ‘‘Crimmigrant’ bodies and bona fide travelers: Surveillance, 
citizenship and global governance’, Theoretical Criminology, 15, 331-
346. 
Aas, K. F. and Bosworth, M. (Ed.) (2013) The Borders of Punishment: 
criminal justice, citizenship and social exclusion, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Aas, K. F. and Gundhus, H. (2016) ‘Global Policing and Mobility: Identity, 
Territory, Sovereignty’, in: B. Bradford, B. Jauregui, I. Loader and J. 
Steinberg (Ed.) SAGE Handbook of Global Policing, London: Sage, 
497 – 514.  
Aguirre, A., & Simmers, J. (2008/9). Mexican Border Crossers: The Mexican 







Armenta, A. (2017) ‘Racializing Crimmigration: Structural Racism, 
Colorblindness, and the Institutional Production of Immigrant 
Criminality’, Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 3, 1, 82-95. 
Balibar, É. (2004) At the Borders of Europe, in: É. Balibar (Ed) We, the 
People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1-10. 
Barker, V. (2015) Border Protests: The role of civil society in transforming 
border control, in: L. Weber (Ed) Rethinking Border Control for a 
Globalizing World, London: Routledge, 133-152. 
Beznec, B., Speer, M. and Stojić-Mitrović, M. (2016) ‘Governing the Balkan 
route: Macedonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime’, Research 
Paper Series of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe, Belgrade. 
Borja, J. and Castells, M. (1997) Local & Global: Management of Cities in the 
Information Age, London: Earthscan. 
Bosworth, M. (2008) ‘Border Control and the Limits of the Sovereign State’, 
Social & Legal Studies, 17, 2, 199-215. 
Bosworth, M.. 2012. Subjectivity and identity in detention: Punishment and 




Bosworth, M., Franko, K. & Pickering, S. 2018. Punishment, globalization and 
migration control: ‘Get them the hell out of here’. Punishment & 
Society, 20, 34-53. 
Bowling, B., & Westenra, S. (2018a). Racism, Immigration and Policing. In M. 
Bosworth, A. Parmar & Y. Vasquez (Eds.), Race, Criminal Justice and 
Migration Control: Enforcing the Boundaries of Belonging. Oxford: 
OUP. 
Bowling, B., & Westenra, S. (2018b). A really hostile environment’: 
Adiaphorization, global policing and the crimmigration control system 
Theoretical Criminology available at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1362480618774034. 
Brandariz-Garcia, J. A. and Fernandez-Bessa, C. (2017) ‘The Managerial 
Turn: The Transformation of Spanish Migration Control Policies since 
the Onset of the Economic Crisis’, The Howard Journal of Crime and 
Justice, 56, 198-219. 
Brown, W. (2010) Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, New York: Zone 
Books. 
Coleman, S. & von Hellermann, P. (eds.) 2009. Multi-sited ethnography : 
problems and possibilities in the translocation of research methods. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Dauvergne, C. 2008. Making People Illegal. What Globalization Means for 




De Giorgi, A. (2010) ‘Immigration control, post-Fordism, and less eligibility: 
A materialist critique of the criminalization of immigration across 
Europe’, Punishment & Society, 12, 2, 147-167. 
de la Baume, M and Surk, B. (2016) ‘Macedonia seeks date for EU 
membership talks’, Politico, 17 March, available at 
http://www.politico.eu/article/macedonias-eu-membership-nightmare-
refugees-migrants-border-nato/ (accessed 4 April 2017). 
Falzon, M. 2009. Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in 
Contemporary Research, Abingdon, Routledge. 
Fox, J., Moroşanu, L. & Szilassy, E. 2012. The Racialization of the New 
European Migration to the UK. Sociology, 46, 680-695. 
FRONTEX (2017) ‘Western Balkan route’, available at 
http://Frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-balkan-route/ 
(accessed 4 April 2017). 
Goffman, E. (1963) Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, 
New Jersey: Penguin. 
Heidenreich, N. and Vukadinović V. S. (2008) ‘In your face: Activism, agit-
prop, and the Autonomy of Migration—the case of Kanak-Attak’, in: 
R. Halle and R. Steingröver (Ed) After the Avant-Garde: 
Contemporary German and Austrian Experimental Film, Rochester: 
Camden House, 131-156.  
Isin, E. (2009) ‘Citizenship in flux: The figure of the activist citizen’, 




Jesuit Social Services (2015) The living conditions of people seeking asylum in 
Australia, Jesuit Social Services, available at http://jss.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Asylum_Seeker_Position_Paper_-
_December_2015.pdf (accessed 7 June 2017). 
Kaufman, E. (2015) Punish and Expel. Border Control, Nationalism, and the 
New Purpose of the Prison, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kingsley, P. (2016) ‘Tens of thousands migrate through Balkans since route 
declared shut’, The Guardian, 31 August, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/tens-of-thousands-
migrate-through-balkans-since-route-declared-shut (accessed 6 April 
2017). 
Lilyanova, V. (2016) ‘The Western Balkans: Frontline of the migrant crisis, 
European Parliamentary Research Service’, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573949/EP
RS_BRI(2016)573949_EN.pdf (accessed 15 February 2018). 
Lukić, V. (2016) Understanding Transit Asylum Migration: Evidence from 
Serbia, International Migration, 54, 4, 31-43. 
Lynch, M. (2015) ‘Backpacking the Border: The Intersection of Drug and 
Immigration Prosecutions in a High-volume US Court’, The British 
Journal of Criminology, 57, 1, 112-131. 
Marcus, G. 1995. Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of 




Mezzadra, S. and Neilson, B. (2011) ‘Borderscapes of Differential Inclusion. 
Subjectivity and Struggles on the Threshold of Justice’s Excess’, in: É. 
Balibar,  S. Mezzadra and R. Samaddar (Ed) Borders of Justice, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 181-203.  
Mezzadra, S. and Neilson, B. (2013) Border as Method, or, the Multiplication 
of Labor, Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
OMITTED 
OMITTED 
Radišić, D., Pejić, M. & Bekto, E. (2015) ‘Migrantska kriza i novi izazovi 
bezbednosti’, in: B. Kovačević (Ed) Rizici i bezbjednosne prijetnje… 
Zbornik radova, Banja Luka: Univerzitet u Banja Luci, 65-72. 
Rayner, G. and Mullholand, R. (2015) ‘Paris attacks: How Europe’s migrant 
crisis gave terrorist Abdelhamid Abaaoud the perfect cover’, The 
Telegraph, 19 November, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/12006713/
paris-attacks-europe-migrant-crisis-terrorist-abdelhamid-abaaoud.html 
(accessed 8 June 2017). 
Robinson, G. (2016) ‘Patrolling the borders of risk: The new bifurcation of 
probation services in England and Wales’, in: M. Bosworth, C. Hoyle 
and L. Zedner (Ed) Changing Contours of Criminal Justice: Research, 
Politics and Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 42-54. 
Romero, M. (2008) ‘Crossing the immigration and race border: A critical race 




Review, 11, 1, 23-37. 
Sassen, S. (2008) ‘Neither global nor national: novel assemblages of territory, 
authority and rights’, Ethics and Global Politics, 1, 1-2, 61-79. 
Stumpf, J. (2006). The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, & Sovereign 
Power. American University Law Review 56(2), 356-420 
Šalamon N 2016 Asylum Systems in the Western Balkan Countries: Current 
Issues, International Migration, 54, 6, 151-163. 
Telegraf (2015) ‘Teroristi se kriju među migrantima: Na stotine njih prošlo 
kroz Srbiju, sumnja se da su neki još uvek u našoj zemlji’, 22 August, 
available at http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/1714215-teroristi-se-kriju-
medju-migrantima-na-stotine-njih-proslo-kroz-srbiju-sumnja-se-da-su-







                                                 
1 This section draws on interviews conducted in transit countries in the Western Balkans 
migratory route – Serbia, Croatia, Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. The semi-structured 
interviews (n=47) with various government agencies and non-governmental organizations in 
the region are a part of a larger research project on mobility and border control in the Western 
Balkans, conducted from 2013-2015, funded by a research seed grant from University of New 
South Wales.  
 
2 This section draws from data collected for the project ‘Foreigners before the criminal courts: 
immigration status, deportability and punishment’, generously funded by the British Academy 




                                                                                                                                
criminal courts and aimed at exploring the relevance of migration status and citizenship for 
criminal justice adjudication. It involves observations of court hearings related to individuals 
who were identified as foreign nationals through references to their nationality or immigration 
status. At a subsequent stage, cases of interest were followed through until completion and 
their respective files retrieved and analysed. The project also involved interviews with 
different actors, including prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, probation officers and 
interpreters.    
 
3 EU law exempts European Economic Area (EEA) nationals from certain migration controls 
applicable to ‘third country’ nationals. 
 
4 Criminal courts are obliged to notify the Home Office when they impose a sentence 
triggering the automatic deportation of the convicted defendant. Nowadays, this exchange of 
information is automatized.  
 
5 Under UK law, a criminal conviction may trigger deportation in the following 
circumstances: criminal courts may recommend deportation following a criminal conviction of 
a foreign national (section 6(2), Immigration Act 1971); non-EEA foreign national offenders 
who have been convicted to a minimum term of 12-month imprisonment or for a serious 
offense are automatically liable to deportation (section 32(1), UK Border Act 2007); finally, 
the Home Secretary could order the deportation of a foreign national offender under the 
‘conducive to public good’ ground (section 3(5)(a), Immigration Act 1971).    
 
6 Since the partial privatization of the probation service and the consequent distribution of 
cases between private companies (Community Rehabilitation Companies) and the National 
Probation Service, cases involving foreign nationals due to be deported have been retained in 
the public sector together with high harm cases and cases where there is exceptional public 
interest and where there is a risk of seriously harmful reoffending.  
 
7 In 2016 in London, 61 per cent of rough sleepers were foreign nationals. Westminster City 
Council (2016), ‘Rough Sleeping in Westminster. Evidence Base’. London, Westminster City 








9 This section draws on 28 interviews conducted in Melbourne, Australia from 2015 to 2017 
with service providers, immigration officials and community organizations that provide legal 
and material support for asylum seekers. The interviews were conducted by one of the authors 
as part of the Australian Research Council Future Fellowship project ‘Globalisation and the 
policing of internal borders’ (FT140101044). 
 
10 Australian Government. Migration Amendment (Bridging Visas—Code of Behaviour) 
Regulation 2013 Explanatory Statement available from 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2013L02102/Explanatory%20Statement/Text 
